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Dear Friends of the House of Finance,
t
he recent crisis in the financial markets
and the ensuing economic downturn have
inspired a vigorous and wide-ranging debate
about the measures required at the interna-
tional level to achieve the proposed funda-
mental overhaul of our financial system. The
crisis has served as a painful reminder that
both markets and individual freedoms need
boundaries and effective regulation.
Blamed for triggering and exacerbating the 
crisis, the banks have found themselves on 
the receiving end of most of the criticism.
Rebuilding trust in the banking system, restor-
ing its basic credibility and preventing such
crises in the future will involve broadening the
existing regulatory framework, increasing its
sophistication and extending it to all of the rele-
vant players. Tougher rules are being created for
banks in an attempt to make the financial sector
more stable and less volatile. The planned “Basel
III” reform is intended to eliminate the root
causes of the deficiencies that have become evi-
dent in the global banking system. Most impor-
tantly, capital adequacy and liquidity require-
ments are to be tightened up in order to make
banks around the world more resilient in the
face of exceptional economic scenarios.
One of the main lessons to be learned is that
banks need to set aside more capital to cover
their risks. I certainly welcome this approach in
principle: we must enhance the ability of our
financial system to cope with risk and it is right,
in principle, for institutions to keep not only
more, but also better quality capital available to
see them through difficult times. We do, how-
ever, need to ensure that whatever measures
are introduced do not prevent us from striking
an effective balance between the need to main-
tain financial system stability and the capacity of
banks to provide finance to the real economy.
An institution’s ability to absorb losses is indi-
cated by its Tier 1 capital ratio, which juxta-
poses the amount of capital that can be
accessed immediately in the event of losses to
risk-weighted assets such as loans and securi-
ties. However, the more demanding the capital
adequacy requirements, the less scope banks
have to actually lend money.
Moreover, according to the proposals drawn 
up by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, in future only ordinary shares and
retained earnings will be deemed to constitute
hard core capital; equity equivalent instruments
such as silent deposits will be excluded.
Representatives of the German banking sector
have rightly questioned the logic of including
unrealised gains on valuation in retained earn-
ings while at the same time leaving out the
silent deposits that have been shown to be uti-
lizable in practice. If such proven equity instru-
ments for banks are permanently available and
fully exposed to any annual loss, they should
also be taken into account when assessing a
bank’s financial strength. The German banking
sector is largely dominated by unlisted institu-
tions which find it much more difficult to raise
equity via the capital markets than, for exam-
ple, the major Anglo-Saxon banks. In any case,
a high capital ratio does not necessarily make
for a more stable bank: what counts more is the
business model and the risks involved.
In my opinion, the envisaged liquidity
requirements also give cause for concern, as 
it is intended that loans and advances to
national governments and central banks be
the main recognised constituents of a bank’s
liquidity cushion. Funds that would have to 
be redeployed as additional liquid resources
under this approach would then no longer be
available for ordinary lending activities.
The governments of the world’s leading
economies will decide on the new regulatory
framework in November at the G20 summit in
Seoul. The timetables for implementation may
include some decidedly lengthy transitional
periods. Nonetheless, the new Basel require-
ments are undoubtedly going to introduce
fundamental changes in the banking sector in
Germany and beyond.
Yours sincerely,
Hans-Dieter Brenner
Chairman of the Board 
of Managing Directors
Helaba Landesbank 
Hessen-Thueringen and 
member of the board of 
trustees of the House of
Finance
EDITORIAL
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ECB INTEREST RATE POLICY AND THE "ZERO LOWER BOUND"
1
S
ince the start of the financial crisis,
central banks across the world have
cut interest rates substantially. In Japan,
Sweden, the Unites States, the United
Kingdom and elsewhere, short-term
interest rates controlled by the central
bank are at or close to zero.  
There are two reasons why this may have 
happened. First, in line with their usual
responses to inflation and economic activity, 
a particularly sharp decline in these variables
prompted central banks to make a correspond-
ingly sharp cut in interest rates. Second, they
may have been worried that economic condi-
tions would worsen to such an extent that
negative interest rates would soon be called
for, and that the “zero lower bound” – the fact
that interest rates cannot be reduced below
zero, if macroeconomic conditions make this
desirable – would prevent policy from being
sufficiently stimulative. 
Monetary policy makers can respond in differ-
ent ways if they come to believe that the 
zero lower bound may become important. One
strategy, which is supported by theoretical
work, is to cut interest rates aggressively and set
lower interest rates than one would have pre-
dicted if the zero lower bound had been irrele-
vant. This makes sense because it supports eco-
nomic activity and, thus, reduces the likelihood
that negative rates will become desirable.
On the other hand, some policy makers have
argued that the possibility of hitting the zero
lower bound calls for more caution in cutting
rates, so as to retain the possibility to cut inter-
est rates at a later date if the economy worsens
further. A central bank following this strategy
would, therefore, set higher interest rates than
it would do so in the absence of the zero lower
bound. 
Alternatively, the central bank may not
change its behavior at all, unless and until the
desired interest rate turns negative and the
zero lower bound bites. It will then set interest
rates at close to zero. In this case, interest rate
setting is unaffected by the zero lower bound
as long as it does not bind. 
The current environment provides a unique
opportunity to explore whether, and how, the
presence of the zero lower bound might have
influenced central bank interest rate setting. 
In a recent working paper, we study the ECB –
which has let overnight interest rates fall to
about 0.25% – to examine whether, and how,
the presence of the zero lower bound has
affected its monetary policy decisions.  
The main problem we face is that we do not
observe what interest rate the ECB would
have set if the zero lower bound was irrele-
vant. To overcome this complication, we esti-
mate a statistical model that allows us to study
how the interest rate the ECB controls
responds to macroeconomic conditions, and
how these responses differ between “ordinary”
and “crisis” times. We also estimate when, and
how rapidly, the transition between the two
regimes occurred. We then ask what interest
rates we would have expected to see if the
ECB had not shifted into “crisis mode.”
We find that, in “ordinary” times, the ECB
tightens monetary policy in response to
stronger economic conditions, higher inflation
and a weaker exchange rate. Our estimates of
the switch in regimes, place this transition in
Stefan Gerlach 
Goethe University and 
Executive Director of the
Institute for Monetary and
Financial Stability and member
of the Executive Committee of
the House of Finance
John Lewis 
De Nederlandsche Bank
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the autumn of 2008, just after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and around the time that
most commentators recognised the possibility
of a large-scale financial crisis. In this “crisis”
period, rates were cut more aggressively to
0.25%, and were then held there.  
The graph shows our best estimate of what
interest rate the ECB would have set if it had
responded in the same way throughout and
had never shifted into crisis mode.
2 Our esti-
mates indicate that whilst we would have
expected the ECB to reduce overnight interest
rates by 300 basis points from 4.0% in
September 2008 to 1% in September 2009, in
fact it reduced interest rates from 4.3% to
0.4% in this same period. These findings are
compatible with the idea that the ECB cut
interest rates aggressively in order to prevent
the economy from deteriorating such that
negative rates would be called for.
But other explanations are also possible. It
could be that our estimates of the ECB’s
responses to economic conditions in “good”
times (i.e. when the zero lower bound is irrel-
evant) provide a poor guide (for reasons totally
unrelated to the zero lower bound) of the
ECB’s reactions to the economy when it is
weaker. Or it could be that the ECB responds
to variables that we incorrectly omitted from
our empirical model and which have nothing
to do with the risk of a negative interest rate
becoming desirable. 
A further reason why one may dispute our
interpretation of these findings is that the
Governing Council of the ECB, which sets
monetary policy, has 22 members. It is difficult
to believe that they all share the same concerns
at any given point in time. Rather, it seems
plausible that there is a range of views and that
policy decisions depend crucially on the medi-
an view. Thus, while some members of the
Governing Council have undoubtedly been
unconcerned about the zero lower bound, oth-
ers have spoken publicly about the need to
recognise the constraint that arises from it.
3
REFERENCES
Gerlach, S., Lewis, J. (2005)
1 “The Zero Lower Bound, ECB Interest Rate Policy
and the Financial Crisis”, February 2010, which
is available at www.stefangerlach.com.
2 Technically, these are dynamic forecasts, comput-
ed using actual values of the regressors but fore-
casted past values of the endogenous variable.
3 See, for instance, the speech by Governor Orpha  -
nides on “The International Financial Turmoil
and the Economy”, given in Limassol on 
28 January 2009.
The full article is available at:
http://www.stefangerlach.com/ECB%20and
%20ZLB%20%28July%2011%29.pdf 
Figure 1: Actual and predicted (assuming no change in the monetary policy regime) overnight interest rate
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nformation management is one of the
most challenging tasks faced by finan-
cial institutions. In the last two decades,
much progress has been made in the
development of quantitative models and
approaches. While a great amount of
effort has been put into an extensive
analysis of quantitative data such as 
historical price series, little attention has
been paid to an (automated) analysis of
the textual data which undoubtedly 
represents a large source of information
in this context.
Prior empirical research has shown that cer-
tain news stories, such as corporate disclo-
sures, can cause abnormal market behavior on
publication. This provides further evidence
that textual data represents a highly relevant
source of new information. On the basis of a
dataset comprised of corporate news stories
and intraday stock prices, this article explores
how such textual data can be analyzed with
the help of machine learning techniques.
WHAT IS MACHINE LEARNING?
Machine learning techniques involve a group
of methods that attempt to enable machines to
acquire knowledge for problem solving by pre-
senting them with historical cases. In a finan-
cial context, such historical cases can for
instance be a sample of news publications that
have been mapped to stock price reactions
observed in the capital markets. Decision Trees
and Artificial Neural Networks are examples of
popular machine learning techniques, and
have already been applied successfully since
the 1960s and 1980s respectively. Lately,
Support Vector Machines (SVM) have been
found promising, especially in cases with a
large feature space (i.e. textual documents).
Nonetheless, each of these techniques has its
own specific characteristics, capabilities, and
shortcomings. These entail, for example, differ-
ent learning strategies, dataset requirements,
and computing times. In general, these meth-
ods aim to predict whether a certain example
falls into one of two categories. For instance,
on the basis of certain training examples, an
SVM can build a model that aims to forecast
whether a future news story can be categorized
as being “relevant” or “not relevant”. What
exactly “relevant” and “not relevant” means
can be defined by the analyst, who might wish
to evaluate whether a price reaction will be
“strong or weak” or “positive, neutral, or neg-
ative” (Groth & Muntermann 2009).
During the following analysis, we will demon-
strate the application of machine learning tech-
niques in the financial domain. Hereby, we aim
to forecast whether or not the publication of a
new corporate disclosure is likely to be fol-
lowed by abnormally high volatility levels.
TEXTUAL DATA DOES MATTER
For this purpose, our analysis is based on cor-
porate disclosures and the intraday stock prices
that were observed for the individual firms
involved both prior to and following the publi-
cation of their specific disclosures. For different
15-minute intervals, realized volatilities were
calculated in order to explore whether or not
such disclosures will trigger significant capital
market activity. Furthermore, the volatility
measures were adjusted by a correction factor
in order to account for market microstructure
effects. Consequently, one can only expect that
volatility increases during abnormal market
phases. Such volatility shocks attract much
attention when it comes to financial manage-
ment, especially in terms of risk management.
As we can see in Figure 1, negligible volatility
increases can be observed for the intervals
prior to the publication of the corporate dis-
closures. In contrast, significant volatility
increases follow their publication. Over the
course of time, the volatility increase adjusts to
a normal level. Somehow, it seems, the infor-
mation provided by the corporate disclosures
drives market activity to higher grounds.
6
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EXPLORING QUALITATIVE DATA IN THE FINANCIAL DOMAIN
UTILIZING MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES
Jan Muntermann 
Goethe University and 
E-Finance Lab
Sven S. Groth 
Goethe University and 
E-Finance Lab
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“LEARNING MACHINES” THAT READ
Within our sample of corporate disclosures,
there are some that resulted in significantly
increased volatility and others that appear 
to have attracted only a little attention. Tra  di  -
tionally, an analyst would review such disclo-
sures and assess their relevance. Given the cor-
porate disclosures involved and the volatility
increases calculated, we define a corresponding
learning task: let a computer learn from the his-
torical data with the goal of identifying those
disclosures that resulted in the 25% highest
volatility increases during the first 15 minutes
following the publication of a corporate disclo-
sure. In other words, based on a disclosure’s
content, the computer should automatically
assign this to either the class for which abnor-
mally high volatility levels are expected or to
the class for which normal volatility levels are
expected. This task is, in turn, divided into two
sub-phases: a learning phase during which the
computer develops a model from the observa-
tions provided, and an application phase during
which this model is then applied. Here, other
observations are evaluated that were not part of
the initial learning dataset. We applied different
machine learning techniques, including Support
Vector Machine, Neural Net (NNet), K-Nearest
Neighbor and Naïve Bayes, in order to find a
model that can be applied to textual corporate
disclosures.
FORECASTING RESULTS
Our results provide evidence that the proposed
machine learning approach is capable of detect-
ing patterns in the content of corporate disclo-
sures. We applied different evaluation metrics in
order to evaluate how well automated text
analysis works. One has to differentiate between
how many cases were identified correctly (preci-
sion), and how many of all relevant disclosures
were identified (recall). Usually, a higher preci-
sion rate can only be achieved by accepting a
lower rate of recall and vice versa. In order to
influence this inherent trade-off, we also includ-
ed misclassification costs as a steering mecha-
nism. We were, for example, able to modify set-
tings in such a way that each corporate disclo-
sure that was assigned to the “abnormally high
volatility” class actually belonged there (i.e.
100% precision). Under NNet, however, merely
11.32% of all disclosures in this class were actu-
ally captured.
While the “classic” evaluation methods men-
tioned above allow for the discovery of possi-
ble dominance relationships among classifiers,
the insights here do not help us to draw a final
conclusion about the general applicability of
the proposed text mining approach. Therefore,
classification quality was further assessed by
means of a domain-specific simulation-based
approach. Thereby, a “straddle option” evalua-
tion vehicle was used to evaluate volatility
forecasts for the period following the publica-
tion of corporate disclosures. We show that the
strategies based on the classifiers’ volatility
forecasts perform significantly better than a
competitive benchmark strategy.
CONCLUSION
The latest machine learning techniques, such
as Support Vector Machines, represent a prom-
ising way of capitalizing more efficiently on the
massive amounts of textual data available 
in financial processes. Under our empirical
analyses, applied algorithms were able to
detect patterns in the contents of corporate
disclosures, and forecasting results were signif-
icantly better than simple random guessing.
The application of these methods in the finan-
cial context is manifold (e.g. see Fung et al.
2005). One possible area of application could
be algorithmic trading, whereby transactions
might be triggered on the basis of textual data
analyzed, as can already be observed in the lat-
est industry developments. With regard to the
observed volatility increases, market monitor-
ing tools may support the management of
intraday market risks.
For more information on this topic, please see
An Intraday Market Risk Management
Approach Based on Textual Analysis by S.S.
Groth and J. Muntermann, which will soon be
forthcoming in Decision Support Systems. 
REFERENCES
Fung, G.P.C., Yu, J.X., Lu, H. (2005)
“The Predicting Power of Textual Information on
Financial Markets”,
IEEE Intelligent Informatics Bulletin, 5 (1) 
Groth, S. S., Muntermann, J. (2009)
“Supporting Investment Management Processes
with Machine Learning Techniques”,
Internationale Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik,
Wien
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Figure 1: Volatility Shocks following the Publication of Corporate Disclosures
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P
revious research on dynamic portfolio
choice over the life cycle argues that
purchasing annuities with immediate life
contingent payouts is important to financ-
ing the consumption of risk-averse house-
holds with uncertain lifetime and no
bequest motive. Life annuities are financial
products that allow investors to protect
against outliving retirement assets while
enhancing expected returns through the
‘mortality credit’. Despite a convincing
theoretical argument, investors around
the world are reluctant to voluntarily
annuitize their wealth. Consequently, the
number of advocates for embedding
annuitization as a default option in tax-
sheltered pension plans is increasing. In
this context, deferred life annuities are
increasingly attracting the attention of
policymakers, regulators and financial
intermediaries.
Similar to an immediate annuity, the provider
of a deferred annuity promises lifelong period-
ic payouts to the annuitant in exchange for a
non-refundable premium. While payments
from immediate annuities start at the date of
purchase, those from deferred life annuities
only commence after a certain number of
years (the deferment period) have passed, sub-
ject to the individual’s survival. Due to the dis-
counting effect as well as the possibility that
the annuitant perishes before payouts start, a
deferred annuity is much cheaper than an
immediate annuity with identical payouts. The
comparably low price of deferred annuities
may help overcome psychological barriers to
voluntary annuitization. 
Cash flow patterns similar to those of deferred
life annuities are provided by state-organized
social security systems and occupational pen-
sion plans of the defined benefit variety. In
both pension schemes, workers contribute a
certain fraction of their labor income during
their working life. In retirement, they receive
pension benefits determined by their contribu-
tions and working years for as long as they live.
Consequently, in a world where state-organ-
ized social security systems are declining in rel-
evance and occupational pension schemes are
shifting from the traditional defined benefit
plans to defined contribution plans, the impor-
tance of deferred life annuities offered in the
private sector might increase in the future.
While immediate life annuities have recently
been studied in great depth, the role of
deferred annuities for households has not yet
been considered in the literature on dynamic
portfolio choice over the life cycle. Our study
seeks to fill this gap by incorporating life annu-
ities with deferred payouts into a life cycle
portfolio choice model, and by deriving opti-
mal consumption, saving and asset allocation
patterns for a household facing an uncertain
lifetime, unspanned labor income, and risky
capital market returns. Subsequently, we also
account for stochastic mortality rates that
result in uncertainty with respect to future
prices of deferred annuities and individual sur-
vival probabilities. 
We set off by analyzing the relevance of annu-
ities with an age of deferment of 65, which is
equal to the retirement age. Hence, they serve
as a direct supplement to retirement income
from the social security system. We show that
investors with moderate risk aversion and
some exposure to labor income risk will start
THE ROLE OF DEFERRED LIFE ANNUITIES IN THE PORTFOLIOS OF
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS
Raimond Maurer 
Goethe University
Ralph Rogalla
Goethe University
HOF-Newsletter_10  21.09.2010  5:51 Uhr  Seite 8purchasing deferred life annuities in their early
forties and will then gradually shift funds from
liquid wealth into annuities until their retire-
ment. At that time, deferred annuities will
already account for 78 percent of total financial
wealth, with the rest being invested in stocks.
With increasing risk aversion, higher labor
income risk, lower replacement rates for state
pensions, as well as stochastic mortality rates,
annuity purchases commence even earlier and
the fraction of total financial wealth invested
in annuities increases. Consistent with the
findings of other studies, earlier in the life
cycle liquid wealth is fully invested in equities
and then gradually shifted into annuities.
Liquid bonds in most cases play only a minor
role and are quickly crowded out by annuities. 
We also find that households use deferred life
annuities to actively hedge against longevity
risk. Even when payouts only commence at
the very advanced age of 85, the investor
begins purchasing deferred annuities at age
42. In case the household faces stochastic
trends in life expectancy, investments in
deferred annuities already begin at age 31 and
the allocation to annuities is significantly high-
er compared to a constant mortality scenario.
In line with prior studies on immediate life
annuities, we find high welfare gains from
including deferred life annuities in the invest-
ment menu. In a world with stochastic trends
in mortality, even an investor aged 20 is will-
ing to give up one quarter of average labor
income to have access to deferred life annu-
ities with payouts starting at age 85.
Consequently, due to their comparably low
price, deferred life annuities might be a good
instrument to help overcome the reluctance of
many individuals to voluntarily annuitize
their retirement nest eggs. 
The above table shows optimal expected asset
allocation, liquid wealth, age at first annuity
purchase, and annuity income. A constant
mortality case assumes the retirement and
deferment age = 65, replacement rate ζ = 68%,
risk aversion ρ = 5, median labor income risk
with volatility of transitory/permanent income
shock = 15%/10%, and no loadings. Stochastic
mortality with trend: mortality rates follow a
bounded, symmetric 9-level trinomial tree with
pu = pd = 0.1 and jump size equal to 5.77% of
the original morality rate. Additionally, mor-
tality rates decline geometrically by 1.42% per
year (other parameters being equal to the con-
stant mortality case). Asset weights are reported
as a percentage of total wealth (liquid wealth +
present value of annuity claims), and liquid
wealth and (lifelong) annuity income at age 65
as a multiple of initial labor income. Expected
values are computed by simulating 50,000 
life cycle paths based on the optimal policies
derived by the numerical optimization.
REFERENCES
Horneff, W., Maurer, R., Rogalla, R. (2010)
“Dynamic Portfolio Choice with Deferred Annuities”,
Journal of Banking and Finance 34 (11), 
2652 – 2664.
The full article is available at:
http://www.ica2010.com/docs/200_final_
paper_Horneff,_et_al.pdf
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Figure 1: Life Cycle Asset Allocation under Alternative Mortality Dynamics
Asset Allocation
Age
Constant Mortality
Age 1
st Ann. Purchase 40
Annuity Income  1.01
Equities (%) 92.1 71.2 21.8 26.2 23.6
Bonds (%) 4.9 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
Annuities (%) 3.0 25.5 78.2 73.8 76.2
Liq. Wealth 10.6 12.8 4.5 4.2 2.3
Stochastic Mortality
with Trend
Age 1
st Ann. Purchase 34
Annuity Income  0.93
Equities (%) 85.4 63.8 32.0 37.1 40.2
Bonds (%) 1.2 1.7 0.0 1.1 3.2
Annuities (%) 13.4 34.5 68.0 61.8 56.6
Liq. Wealth 10.8 13.1 7.9 8.6 7.7
45 55 65 75 85
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
MARKET DISCIPLINE & BUSINESS ETHICS
P
rof. Klaus Hopt, a member of the
German National Academy Leopol  -
dina in Halle, was a Director at the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign Private and
Private International Law from 1995
until his retirement in 2008. His main
areas of research are corporate (German
and European), capital market, commer-
cial, banking and business law.
What is your stance on the recent European
Commission Green Paper on corporate gover-
nance in financial institutions and remunera-
tion policies?
Prof. Hopt: The financial crisis has revealed
serious deficiencies in the corporate governance
of financial institutions – the faulty incentives
created by compensation practices, deficiencies
in board profile and practices, and failures in
risk management and internal control. These
were exacerbated by complex and opaque bank
structures. The Commission cannot count on
shareholders to demand reform. Shareholders
want a return on their investment and are risk-
prone while debt holders want their money
and are risk-averse. Equity governance is differ-
ent from debt governance. More promising
reform targets are the board and bank struc-
ture. This would involve, for example, having a
separate risk committee, dealing with the prob-
lem of complex and opaque bank structures,
and instituting group-wide corporate gover-
nance. All this must be supervised and rigor-
ously enforced by regulators, and it would be
great if there were more market discipline and
business ethics at the top.
What are the risks and opportunities of imple-
menting corporate governance codes?
Prof. Hopt: I am a supporter of corporate
governance codes. Just think of the advances
made by this idea since the Combined Code 
of the Cadbury Committee in the UK in 1992.
Today there is no major industrial country
without such a code. Corporate governance
codes are part of self-regulation. I know that
pleading for self-regulation is not very timely
after the financial crisis. But self-regulation is
much more flexible than any law: it is based
on cooperation; it can try out new solutions;
and it can be changed quickly if it does 
not work or new challenges arise. Yet self-
regulation only functions well in the shadow
of the law. Without the threat of a “big stick”, 
free-riding becomes rampant and outsiders 
are taken advantage of. This has been the
American experience and can also be seen
here in Germany.  
What kind of research do we need on corporate
governance? 
Prof. Hopt: Take self-regulation and corporate
governance again. In Germany, the legal
method is basically doctrinal. What is needed is
theoretical and empirical research and interdis-
ciplinary cooperation. For example, how does
self-regulation work? What are its deficien-
cies? Which mechanisms are needed in order
to enforce it? Does mandatory disclosure help?
Traditionally, lawyers have not been interested
in the forces that have shaped the law and how
effective the law is in practice. Here economics
can help. One could, for example, conduct an
event study after the change of a corporate
governance rule, or observe how finance theo-
ry helps us better understand what is happen-
ing in the markets. Of course, there are caveats
– just think of the efficient capital market the-
ory in its weak, semi-strong, or strong forms.
Having said this, economists also need lawyers.
We lawyers know the relevant institutions and
how they work. Without this knowledge, the
models employed may omit decisive variables.
Klaus Hopt 
Member of the 
German National
Academy Leopoldina
HOF-Newsletter_10  21.09.2010  5:51 Uhr  Seite 1011
Executive Education Report ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 3/2010
INTRODUCTION
The financial crises of the past few years have
also affected business schools. The process of
‘right-sizing’ companies has inarguably affected
HR development budgets. But external eco-
nomic conditions are only partially to blame 
for the lack of growth at many executive edu-
cation providers. Many providers have not yet
holistically understood or properly managed
executive education’s three main deliverables.
In what follows, I outline a three-dimensional
framework of deliverables – critical success fac-
tors – for these times of crisis and subsequent
economic recovery. 
TEACHING SKILLS
There is an army of trainers and faculty afoot,
especially since the content for many topics –
including readily formatted slides – can easily
be obtained through a Google search. With the
exception of a few schools that truly excel at
thought leadership, the content of executive
education seminars is no longer the main 
differentiator for schools. For example, even
MIT posts the slides and reading lists for hun-
dreds of courses online, where they are avail-
able at no charge. Merely teaching skills with
a focus on content (e.g. marketing or entre-
preneurship) is not the way forward for busi-
ness schools. Goethe Business School has a
holistic understanding of its task. We seek to
create an outstanding customer learning expe-
rience – something like a refreshing mind spa
beyond merely focusing on content.
PROVIDING ANSWERS
Beyond skill and knowledge seminars, the
other primary dimension of executive educa-
tion is excellence in the co-creation of answers.
An Asian car manufacturer wants to conquer
European markets and prepare for its distribu-
tion and after-sales service. But how should this
emerging player proceed? While this was tradi-
tionally the preserve of consultants, companies
are increasingly turning to business schools to
tap into their brainpower and knowledge gen-
eration capabilities. They do not seek ready
answers. They seek environments in which
they can co-create answers with selected
experts from the business school network.
Providing such services represents future
growth opportunities, alongside skills seminars.
EDUCATIONAL CONSULTING
Business schools must do extremely well at edu-
cational consulting for individuals and organiza-
tions. The best schools excel at matching cours-
es and learning paths with specific individual
needs. Business schools should be trustworthy
partners, rather than salespeople. Organizations
currently scrutinize all areas in HR development
for cost saving, outsourcing, and other optimiza-
tion opportunities. Helping firms revisit their value
chains (beyond merely offering courses) allows
for close relationships based on trust. Such rela-
tionships survive economic crises more easily.
CONCLUSION
Executive education courses at many business
schools have mushroomed, just like MBA pro-
grams have. In the past few years, an increas-
ing supply of such courses has not been met
by a corresponding rise in demand from the
corporate world. As companies continue to
restructure and optimize, so will business
schools. Understanding these three dimen-
sions is the crucial first step to preparing for
sustained growth in executive education. 
THE THREE CRUCIAL DELIVERABLES IN EXECUTIVE EDUCATION
Business Challenges and Educational Consultancy
Teaching skills Educational consultancy
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Traditional trade schools / academies providing skills trainings
Traditional business schools pushing content
Wolfgang Amann 
Goethe Business School
HOF-Newsletter_10  21.09.2010  5:51 Uhr  Seite 1112
Selected HoF Publications ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 3/2010
SELECTED HOUSE OF FINANCE PUBLICATIONS
Baums, T. (2010) 
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steuerung_im_aktienrecht.pdf 
Cahn, A., Donald, D. C. (2010) 
“Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases
on the Laws Governing Corporations in Ger  -
many, the UK and the USA”,  
Cambridge University Press 
Gewald, H. (2010) 
“The perceived benefits of business process
outsourcing: An Empirical Study of the Ger  man
Banking Industry”,  
Strategic Outsourcing; Vol. 3; Issue 2; 89 – 105 
Groth, S., Muntermann, J. (2010) 
“An Intraday Market Risk Management
Approach Based on Textual Analysis”,  
forthcoming in Decision Support Systems 
Hanauske, M., Kunz, J., Bernius, S.,
König, W. (2010) 
“Doves and hawks in economics revisited: An
evolutionary quantum game theory based
analysis of financial crises”,  
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Appli  -
cations; Vol 389; Issue 21; 5084 – 5102 
Horneff, W., Maurer, R., Rogalla, R. (2010) 
“Dynamic Portfolio Choice with Deferred
Annuities”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 34 (11), 
2652 – 2664
Kraft, H., Seifried, F. (2010) 
“Foundations of Continuous-time Recrusive
Utility: Differentiability and Normalization of
Certainty Equivalents”,  
Mathematics and Financial Economics
Messerschmidt, C., Berger, S. C., Skiera, B.
(2010) 
“Web 2.0 im Retail Banking: Einsatz  möglich  -
keiten, Praxisbeispiele und empirische Nutzer  -
analyse”,  
Wiesbaden, Gabler Verlag 
Molitor, D., Hinz, O., Wegmann, S. (2010) 
“The Interplay between Psychometric and
Sociometric Data and the Willingness to Adopt
New Products”,  
forthcoming in Zeitschrift für Betriebs  wirt  -
schaft (ZfB) 
Pahlke, I., Beck, R., Wolf, M. (2010) 
“Enterprise Mashup Systems as Platforms for
Situational Applications – Benefits and Challen  -
ges in the Business Domain”,  
forthcoming in Business & Information Systems
Engineering, 5/2010 
Siekmann, H. (2010) 
“Das neue Europäische Finanzaufsichts  system”,
IMFS Working Paper No. 40,
http://www.imfs-frankfurt.de/documents/
WP_40_2010_Siekmann 
Wahrenburg, M. (2010) 
“Risikomanagement und Diversifikation in der
Finanzindustrie – Eine akademische Perspek  tive”, 
Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung,
61/2010, S. 1 – 17 
Wandt, M. (2010) 
“Kommentierungen der §§ 163, 164 VVG
(Lebens  versicherung)”,  
forthcoming in Langheid/Wandt, Münchener
Kommentar zum Versicherungsvertragsrecht,
Vol. 2 
Wieland, V. (2010) 
“Quantitative Easing: A Rationale and some
Evidence from Japan”,  
L. Reichlin and K. West (eds.), NBER Inter  -
national Seminar on Macroeconomics, NBER
Book Series, University of Chicago Press 
Wolf, M., Beck, R., Vykoukal, J. (2010) 
“An Integrated Perspective on IT Project
Alignment in Highly Dynamic Environments –
A Multi-Level Analysis”,  
conditionally accepted at the 31st Interna  -
tional Conference on Information Systems
(ICIS 2010); Saint Louis, Missouri, USA 
Zickert, F., Beck, R. (2010) 
“Because Effort Matters! – A Mapping Model
for Assessing Project Effort in Requirements
Engineering”,  
Business & Information Systems Engineering
Vol 2; Issue 3, 165 – 173
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From August 25–28, 2010, Goethe University
and its House of Finance hosted the 37
th Annual
Meeting of the European Finance Association
(EFA) at Campus Westend. The meeting, chaired
by Jan Pieter Krahnen, was the third of its kind
held in Germany, after those of Bad Homburg
(1979) and Berlin (2000). EFA annual meetings
have come to be the leading academic confer-
ence on finance-related topics in Europe, with
researchers from all over the globe in atten-
dance. As in previous years, the academic pro-
gram put together was based on a rigorous
review process; one guaranteeing the high
quality of papers accepted for presentation at
the conference. 1,494 papers were submitted
for consideration, from which 224 were finally
selected for inclusion in the academic program.
650 participants were registered in total.
A special highlight of the conference was the
keynote lecture given by Douglas Diamond from
the University of Chicago. His speech focused on
short-term debt as the main reason for the
financial crises observed in history. Diamond
noted that during the latest crisis of 2007–2009,
financial institutions such as banks and hedge
funds used too much short-term debt for the
refinancing of long-term projects. He concluded
that regulation should limit excessive use of
short-term debt for refinancing purposes, and
that it should apply to all financial institutions,
rather than just to banks. Furthermore,
Diamond argued in favor of requirements for
increased equity provision, more specifically,
whereby a third of requirements are fulfilled via
so-called “regulatory hybrid securities”. These
securities are to be transformed into equity, and
thereby strengthen financial institutions, when
two conditions are first met: (i) the regulatory
authority declares that the financial system
suffers from a systemic crisis; and (ii) the finan-
cial institution falls short of its equity provi-
sion requirement.
Part of the program contributed to contempo-
rary policy debates. In particular, there were
three Policy Panels with well-known personal-
ities from academia, industry and politics,
which were devoted to an open discussion on
highly relevant policy issues. The panel on
Bank Resolution discussed alternative ways to
address the problem of moral hazard in bank-
ing, and how to re-introduce restructuring as a
viable option for systemically important banks.
The pros and cons of contingent capital as a
new financial instrument were also addressed,
as well as the difficulties emanating from the
wind down of banks with large derivative posi-
tions and the impact of large bank failures on
liquidity and prices in capital markets. The
panel on the Future of Financial Regulation
covered the challenges that regulatory author-
ities face in their efforts to redesign rules for
financial institutions and markets. Finally, the
panel on Transaction Taxes and Short-Selling
Restrictions focused on scientific evidence
regarding the consequences of such measures
for market efficiency, and discussed their
repercussions for financial stability in general.
Conference participants generally agreed that
the 2010 EFA meeting in Frankfurt was an out-
standing success marked by an excellent, high-
level academic turnout. Goethe University and
Campus Westend were greatly appreciated, as
were all persons involved in the organization of
such a rewarding and inspiring event.
37
TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION
HELD IN FRANKFURT
Welcome Reception
Jan Pieter Krahnen and Günter Franke Reinhard H. Schmidt and Christian Sewing
EFA Panel
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STIPENDIARY TO COME TO THE
HOUSE OF FINANCE
On October 1, 2010, Sergey Volchenkov will
join the research team for the Chair of Invest  -
ment, Portfolio Management, and Pension
Finance for one year. Volchenkov’s visit will 
be facilitated by a German Chancellor Fellow  -
ship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foun  -
dation. This foundation grants up to ten such
fellowships annually to prospective leaders from
the US, China, and the Russian Federation.
Recipients of a German Chancellor Fellow  ship
can carry out a project of their own design in
cooperation with a German host that they have
selected.
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ROMAN INDERST 
WINS RENOWNED GERMAN
RESEARCH AWARD
Roman Inderst has been
awarded the Gossen Prize
of the Verein für Social  po  -
litik, Germany’s oldest and
most important association
for economists. This prize is
endowed with €10,000 and
is bestowed annually to a
distinguished young econ-
omist whose work has gained international
recognition. Inderst is Professor of Finance and
Economics at Goethe University, and Director of
the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability. 
Roman Inderst
HELMUT SIEKMANN RECEIVES HONORARY
DOCTORATE FROM UNIVERSITÉ PARIS-DAUPHINE
The Université Paris-Dauphine will award an honorary doctorate to Helmut
Siekmann, Director of the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability.
During a long and distinguished legal career, Professor Siekmann has acquired
an extensive international experience. He has been a visiting scholar in the US
and also in Europe, where he has previously taught at the Université d'Orléans
and the Université Paris-Dauphine. His research focuses on all aspects of gov-
ernment finance, the institutional framework for the European System of
Central Banks, the role of central banks and their legal foundations, as well as the Stability and
Growth Pact of the EU, and the supervision of financial markets.
Helmut
Siekmann 
NEW HOLDER OF EUREX-ENDOWED ASSISTANT
PROFESSORSHIP
Grigory Vilkov assumed the EUREX endowed Assistant Professorship for
Derivatives on September 1, 2010. Vilkov studied business administration at
the University of Rochester in the US and at INSEAD in France. His areas of
interest are portfolio optimization, asset pricing, and derivatives. 
Grigory Vilkov 
TWO NEW ASSISTANT PROFESSORS TO JOIN THE
DEPARTMENT OF MONEY AND MACROECONOMICS
Pooyan Amir Ahmadi has become a Assistant Professor for Empirical Macro  -
economics at Goethe University. He studied economics at the Humboldt Uni  versity
of Berlin, where he was a research assistant to Prof. Harald Uhlig. Before starting
his doctoral studies, Ahmadi went to Princeton University as a visiting graduate
student. On obtaining his Ph.D., he continued his research activities in the
Monetary Policy Research Division of the European Central Bank. Ahmadi’s main
area of research is Bayesian econometrics, monetary policy, and macroeconomics.
Ctirad Slavik studied economics at Charles University in Prague and at the
University of Minnesota before joining Goethe University as a Assistant Professor
for Macroeconomic Theory. While completing his Ph.D. program, Slavik worked
as a research analyst at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis from 2007 until
very recently. In his work, he focuses on the role of microeconomic frictions on
macroeconomic outcomes, for example, how financing frictions at the firm level
can help us understand the high stock market volatility observed.
Pooyan Amir
Ahmadi 
Ctirad Slavik 
JAN KRAHNEN TO BECOME NEW
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN
FINANCE ASSOCIATION (EFA)
Jan Krahnen, a member of
the House of Finance and
a Director of the Center
for Financial Studies, will
become the new President
of the prestigious Euro  -
pean Finance Association.
He is supposed to take
over the presidency from
Kristian R. Miltersen of the Copenhagen
Business School in 2011. The EFA aims to pro-
vide a professional society for academics and
practitioners with an interest in financial man-
agement, financial theory, and its application.
Jan Krahnen 
HELMUT GRÜNDL TO JOIN THE
HOUSE OF FINANCE
Helmut Gründl will assume
the Chair of Insurance and
Insurance Regulation in
October 2010. This chair
was endowed by the Fede  -
ral State Government of
Hessen and the Gesamtver    -
band der Deutschen Ver  -
sicherungwirtschaft and is
embedded in the International Center for
Insurance Regulation. Gründl will be leaving 
his position as Professor of Insurance and Risk
Ma  na  gement at the Humboldt University 
of Berlin. 
Helmut Gründl 
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
Tuesday, 2
nd IMFS Lecture:   
6pm – 7.30pm “Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences,
Reform”
Speaker: Dr. Alessio M. Pacces, Associate
Professor of Law and Economics Erasmus
Instituut Toezicht & Compliance
Friday, 5
th  ILF Conference: 
9.45am – 5.45pm “Too Big To Fail – Brauchen wir ein
Sonder  insolvenzrecht für Banken? 
Do we need Special Rules for Bank
Resolution?”
Speakers: Dr. Andreas Dombret, Bundes  bank,
Prof. Dr. Martin Hellwig, MPI for Collective
Goods, Bonn (among others)
Participation at this conference is by invitation only
Friday, 5
th ILF Conference: 
10.15am – 5pm “Tagung zum Wirtschafts  strafrecht”
Participation at this conference is by invitation only
Wednesday, 10
th CFS Colloquium: 
5.30pm – 7pm “Supervision of International Financial
Markets”
Speaker: José Viñals, Financial Counselor and
Director, Monetary and Capital Markets
Department, IMF
Friday, 19
th – ILF 3rd Symposium:  
Saturday, 20
th “Economy, Criminal Law, Ethics (ECLE)”
9am – 6pm Participation at this conference is by invitation only
Tuesday, 16
th Finance Seminar:
5.15pm – 6.30pm Speaker: Astrid Schornick, INSEAD
Tuesday, 23
th Finance Seminar:
5.15pm – 6.30pm Speaker: Claus Munk, Aarhus University
Thursday, 25
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar
12am – 1pm
Tuesday, 30
th Finance Seminar:
5.15pm – 6.30pm Speaker: Stefan Nagel, Stanford Graduate
School of Business
DECEMBER
Thursday, 2
nd  IMFS Distinguished Lecture:  
tba “The Fault Lines in Cross-Boarder
Banking: Lessons from the Iceland Case”
Speaker: Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the
Central Bank of Iceland
Saturday, 4
th Doctorate/Ph.D. Program in Law and 
5pm Economics of Money and Finance: 
First Interdisciplinary Doctoral Workshop,
Participation at this conference is by invitation only
Monday, 6
th EFL Jour-Fixe:  
5pm “Consequences of Organizational Mind  -
fulness in IT Innovation Assimilation
Processes – Results from the Financial
Services Industry”
Speaker: Martin Wolf
Wednesday, 8
th CFS Colloquium: 
5.30pm – 7pm  “Capital Requirements”
Speaker: Nout Wellink, President, 
De Nederlandsche Bank
Tuesday, 14
th Finance Seminar: 
5.15pm – 6.30pm  “A Lintner model of dividends and 
managerial rents”
Speaker: Bart Lambrecht, Lancaster University
Please refer to http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/veranstaltungen 
for continuous updates of the event calendar.
OCTOBER
September,   German Economic Association for 
Wednesday, 29
th – Business Administration: 
October, Friday, 1
st “XI. Symposium zur Ökonomischen
Analyse der Unternehmung” 
Organisation: Prof. Dr. Reinhard Schmidt
Monday, 4
th EFL Jour-Fixe:
5pm “Corporate Cost of Borrowing: 
TRACE on Syndicated Loans”
Speaker: Markus Fischer, E-Finance Lab
Thursday, 7
th – CFS Executive Education: 
Friday, 8
th “Workshop Zinsderivate: Analyse und
9am – 6pm Bewertung in der Praxis”
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang M. Schmidt,
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Thursday, 7
th ILF Conference:
7pm – 9pm “Frankfurter Forum für kapitalmarkt  -
bezogene Restrukturierung” 
Speaker: Daniel Weiß, Hengeler Mueller
Monday, 25
th IMFS Distinguished Lecture:
6pm – 7.30pm “Central Banking after the Financial Crisis”
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Jürgen Stark, Member of the
ECB’s Executive Board
Thursday, 28
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar 
12am – 1pm
NOVEMBER
Monday, 1
st EFL Jour-Fixe:  
5pm “An Analysis of International Bank
Profitability, Dynamics and Its Persistence:
A Focus on Germany”
Speaker: Christian Stammschulte
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